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Summary 
The hypothesis considered here is that cognition is based on a small set of systems-level 
computational primitives that are defined at a level higher than single neurons. It is pointed out 
that for one such set of primitives, whose quantitative effectiveness has been demonstrated by 
analysis and computer simulation, emerging technologies for stimulation and recording are 
making it possible to test directly whether cortex is capable of performing them. 
 
1. Introduction  
In both biology and computer science the virtue of modularity in complex systems is widely 
understood. In contrast, the idea that complex systems need to have many levels of description, 
while well appreciated in computer science, has been much less discussed in biology. We believe 
that for a computational theory of cortex to be useful, it would need to give an account of 
algorithmic tasks at levels intermediate between those of neurons and behavior. Just as we cannot 
understand the workings of a cell phone by studying its operations only at the single bit level, we 
cannot expect to understand the brain at the single neuron level. 
The suggestion we explore here is that cognitive computation in cortex is built on a small 
collection of base primitives at the systems level. This contrasts with Hebbian plasticity (Hebb, 
1949), which is a single primitive at the single neuron level.  Here we discuss one candidate for 
such a collection of base primitives, one distinguished by the existence of demonstrations, by 
analysis and computer simulations, that it offers a scheme in which the capacity of cortex for 
basic cognitive tasks can be given a quantitative explanation (Valiant 1994, 2005, 2006; Feldman 
& Valiant 2009). This collection consists of: association, memorization, inductive learning, and 
hierarchical memory assignment, all suitably defined. The purpose of this note is to point out that 
because of technological advances over the last decades, especially in optogenetics (Miyawaki et 
al. 1997, Boyden et al. 2005, Deisseroth et al. 2006, Shemesh et al. 2017), it is now becoming 
feasible to test systematically whether cortex can indeed perform these primitives. 
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These four primitives are defined below in terms of their actions on randsets, random sets of 
neurons of a certain size. The nature of the proposed experiments is analogous to “in-circuit 
testing” of a traditional electronic printed circuit board, where instead of testing the input-output 
behavior of the whole board, the testing is done on smaller parts, using only probes. In the 
proposed experiments there will be no sensory stimuli or behavioral responses – the experiments 
will consist entirely of stimulating and recording from appropriate sets of neurons. The goal is to 
find out what changes in computational function in a subcircuit of cortex can be achieved by 
specific neural stimulation. Existing experimental evidence that the firing patterns of cortical 
neurons can be altered by suitable behavioral training (Jackson et al. 2006, Rebesco et al. 2010) is 
relevant and encouraging, but does not directly address the question of which computational 
primitives are being executed. Behaviors prompted by sensory inputs cause all kinds of activity in 
the brain extraneous to the execution of any one primitive. The in-circuit methodology is 
suggested to isolate the operation of a subcircuit as much as possible from such interference.  
The goal therefore is to test, by direct neural stimulation and recording, whether cortex is 
capable of performing certain basic computational tasks. The paradigmatic first such task is 
“association of a set A to set B”, abbreviated as A→B, which here is defined as follows: for 
neuron sets A and B we want to induce the new functionality that, after the training, whenever set 
A is stimulated  then the newly modified circuit will cause set B to become active also. Training 
here would involve stimulating A and B according to some timed protocol. Testing would involve 
stimulating A again and now recording from the set B that had been stimulated in training. This 
particular task may be viewed as a direct systems level analog of Hebbian plasticity.  
We note that our notion of randsets is not the same as the notion of assemblies, in the 
sense of Hebb (1949). That traditional notion of assemblies is associated with the idea that the 
neurons in these assemblies are better connected to each other than to other neurons (e.g. Carillo-
Read et al. 2017). Randsets account for the claimed computational capabilities simply by virtue of 
being randomly chosen, and probably with weak criteria of randomness being sufficient. There is 
no requirement that they be well connected to each other. The theory basically asserts that for 
random sets in a randomly connected network there will be a large enough bandwidth of reliable 
communication from one randset to another, that simple local updates at the neurons that result 
from training will be sufficient to realize the claimed functionalities. There is no comparable 
theory that shows that the high interconnectivity assumption of traditional assemblies provides 
any comparable computational capabilities. Fortunately, also, it is the randset theory that appears 
to be one that is readily testable experimentally for the sets of operations we contemplate, since 
random sets are more easily identified than highly interconnected ones. (Of course, it may be that 
our randsets, once selected, do become more strongly connected to each other over time, but that 
is not our concern here.)  
An experiment relevant to what we are contemplating here is reported in Seeman et al. 
(2017), where the setting up of such associations was attempted by electronic stimulation, but did 
not succeed reliably. The experiment was done for one value of r. Possible interpretations are that 
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the value of r used there was too small, or that it was not a part of cortex that performs this 
function. We are suggesting a systematic exploration of the relevant parameter space, and in 
particular the set size r. Another relevant result, one obtained by optogenetic means, is by 
Carrillo-Reid et al. (2016), which can be viewed as also an example of “in-circuit” testing, but the 
task considered there was pattern completion, as in auto-associative nets (e.g. Hopfield, 1982). 
We believe that pattern completion is a less fundamental operation for our purposes than the ones 
we consider here, since there is no clear definition of what it should be, and any reasonable 
system offers some version of it as an epiphenomenon. 
 
2. The Four Tasks and their Potential Validation 
Each instance of the tasks described here can be induced by an associated training 
protocol, and is realized as local changes in the neurons within the given randomly connected 
network, giving rise to a subcircuit having the functionality of that task instance. Computer 
simulations (Feldman & Valiant, 2009) show that thousands of instances of such tasks can be 
realized with realistic network parameters without having the continued effectiveness of the 
earlier ones acquired degraded by later ones. We note that having multiple task types, which 
between them may be adequate to form a basis for cognition, is a much more exacting 
requirement than single-task models such as traditional “auto-associative nets” which perform the 
single task of pattern completion. The longer term motivation is that of identifying a “cognitively 
adequate’’ set of primitives, perhaps our four forming the core, and showing that higher level 
cognitive operations can be efficiently implemented in terms of these. 
The following detail the four tasks that we are suggesting as the core, and for which we are here 
suggesting validation by in-circuit testing. An example of some more detailed specifications still, 
for one incarnation, is described by Feldman and Valiant (2009). 
Association: For sets A, B train so that result is: If in future A is stimulated then B (but not random 
other neurons) will become active. 
Supervised Memorization of Conjunctions: For sets A, B, C train so that the result is: If in 
future A and B are stimulated then C will become active also (but not if just one of A, B is 
stimulated.) 
Inductive Learning of Simple Threshold Functions: For sets A, B, C, D (say) train so that the 
resulting circuit generalizes a classification at target A, beyond the examples seen, according to a 
linear separator on the variables B, C, D. In particular, if in future some subset of B, C, D is 
stimulated then the target A will become active according to whether some linear separator 
consistent with the examples holds. For example such a linear separator may be B + C + 2D ≥ 2, 
where now these variables have a 1/0 interpretation corresponding to whether the randsets are 
active or not.  
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Hierarchical Memory Formation: For sets A, B, train so that result is: a set C (not specified by 
the experimenter) has been allocated by the computation internally so that the effect “supervised 
memorization of conjunctions” is achieved for A, B and that, now unknown, C. This realizes the 
fundamental psychological task of “chunking”, where a new compound concept, here A & B, 
becomes equal citizen in the circuit with earlier ones.  
While the first three of these tasks can be tested directly by in-circuit testing, the last task 
appears more difficult. One possible approach is to glean information using the timing mechanism 
at work.  
 Verifying how these tasks are realized in cortex, if indeed they are, is a further area of 
challenge. The suggestion has been made (Valiant, 2012) that the hippocampal system is 
responsible for determining the identity of the randset C in hierarchical memory formation, for 
given A and B. Such a statement, which assigns responsibility for performing a particular task to a 
particular brain area, may be easier to test. 
3. General Considerations 
How large sets?  In the analysis the parameter r is dependent on the number of neurons in the 
system, the number of connections, the synaptic strengths, and the algorithms used for realizing the 
tasks. For the association task, for example, having r too small will fail to train the target B as 
desired, while having r too large will train too many spurious neurons in addition. Hence, we expect 
that considerable experimentation may be needed to find the right value of r in any one cortical 
area. Note that in this case of associations, the size of the source set A appears to be critical, but this 
is the easier set in that it only needs stimulation. The size of the target set B, which has to be both 
stimulated and recorded from, may be much less critical. 
Which brain areas? To test our theory one needs to perform the experiment in a cortical area 
where the corresponding task is implemented in biology. We have behaving mammals in mind. It 
may be that primates are the best at some of these tasks. There is some uncertainty as to which parts 
of cortex perform these various tasks, and some experimentation there may be necessary. 
How sets chosen? Since the hypothesis requires that the experiment work for randomly chosen sets 
of a certain size in the appropriate brain areas, it is reasonable to go with whatever bias the 
experimental technique used imposes. Neurons in particular layers may need to be found. The 
theory aims to explain how large numbers of task instances can be processed. Hence, experiments 
need to be done in parts of cortex that are large enough that it is plausible that so many tasks are 
indeed supported. The various sets A, B, C, etc., may be in the same cortical area, or in different 
areas. 
What timing protocols for training? Timing may be critical. When stimulating a pair of sets A, B 
for association we need an asymmetric protocol, such as B being stimulated with one millisecond 
delay after A. 
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Comparisons? Comparative studies for different cortical areas and different species, including 
humans, would be of great interest. 
4. Conclusion 
The hypothesis to be tested is that cortex is able to perform a specific set of tasks on random sets of 
neurons. The new opportunity is offered by the remarkable recent advances in stimulation and 
recording technologies. The experiments would determine whether these tasks can be performed in 
appropriate cortices, but not how. However, positive results would demonstrate that the brain has 
impressive computational capabilities that are relevant to cognitive computation. These systems-
level capabilities, if present, are unlikely to have arisen by accident. It would be a remarkable 
coincidence if the brain had these capabilities but did not use them.  
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